Insecure object reference - Personal information - Go

Insecure object reference - Personal information - Go

Need

Secure access control and proper authorization mechanisms

Context

  • Usage of Go 1.16 for developing high-performance and efficient applications
  • Usage of gin-gonic/gin for building web applications in Go

Description

Non compliant code

        package main

import (
	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)

type User struct {
	ID    string
	Name  string
	Email string
}

var users = []User{
	{ID: "1", Name: "User1", Email: "user1@example.com"},
	{ID: "2", Name: "User2", Email: "user2@example.com"},
}

func main() {
	r := gin.Default()

	r.GET("/user/:id", func(c *gin.Context) {
		id := c.Param("id")

		for _, user := range users {
			if user.ID == id {
				c.JSON(200, user)
				return
			}
		}

		c.JSON(404, gin.H{"message": "User not found"})
	})

	r.POST("/user/:id", func(c *gin.Context) {
		id := c.Param("id")
		var newUser User

		if err := c.BindJSON(&newUser); err != nil {
			c.JSON(400, gin.H{"message": "Bad Request"})
			return
		}

		for i, user := range users {
			if user.ID == id {
				users[i] = newUser
				c.JSON(200, gin.H{"message": "User updated successfully"})
				return
			}
		}

		c.JSON(404, gin.H{"message": "User not found"})
	})

	r.Run()
}
        
        

The vulnerable code snippet is a simple Go server using the Gin framework. It defines a User struct and a slice of User objects. The server has two endpoints: GET /user/:id and POST /user/:id.

The GET /user/:id endpoint allows anyone to get the details of a user by providing their ID in the URL. This is a security issue because it exposes sensitive user information to anyone who knows a user's ID.

The POST /user/:id endpoint is even more problematic. It allows anyone to update the details of a user by sending a JSON object in the request body and providing the user's ID in the URL. This is a serious security vulnerability because it allows an attacker to alter the details of any user, including changing their email address, without any form of authentication or authorization.

The root cause of this vulnerability is the insecure direct object reference (IDOR). The server uses the user's ID, provided in the URL, directly to identify the user in its data store. This is insecure because an attacker can easily guess or brute-force these IDs and gain unauthorized access to other users' data.

Steps

  • Implement proper authentication and authorization mechanisms to ensure that only authorized users can access and modify user information.
  • Use session management or token-based authentication to securely identify and authenticate users.
  • Ensure that the user making the request has the necessary permissions to access and modify the requested user information.
  • Avoid using user-provided input directly as identifiers or keys for accessing user information. Instead, use a secure and unique identifier that cannot be easily manipulated.
  • Validate the user input to ensure that it is within the expected range and format before using it to access or modify user information.
  • Implement access control checks to verify that the authenticated user has the necessary privileges to access and modify the requested user information.
  • Consider implementing a role-based access control (RBAC) system to manage user permissions and restrict access to sensitive operations.
  • Regularly update and patch the application and its dependencies to address any known security vulnerabilities.
  • Perform regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and address any potential vulnerabilities in the application.
  • Educate developers about secure coding practices and provide training on common security vulnerabilities to prevent similar issues in the future.

Compliant code

        package main

import (
	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
	"github.com/dgrijalva/jwt-go"
	"net/http"
)

type User struct {
	ID    string
	Name  string
	Email string
}

type Claims struct {
	Username string `json:"username"`
	jwt.StandardClaims
}

var users = []User{
	{ID: "1", Name: "User1", Email: "user1@example.com"},
	{ID: "2", Name: "User2", Email: "user2@example.com"},
}

var jwtKey = []byte("your_secret_key")

func main() {
	r := gin.Default()

	r.POST("/login", func(c *gin.Context) {
		var creds User
		if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&creds); err != nil {
			c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"message": "Bad Request"})
			return
		}

		for _, user := range users {
			if user.Name == creds.Name && user.Email == creds.Email {
				expirationTime := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute)
				claims := &Claims{
					Username: user.Name,
					StandardClaims: jwt.StandardClaims{
						ExpiresAt: expirationTime.Unix(),
					},
				}

				token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
				tokenString, err := token.SignedString(jwtKey)
				if err != nil {
					c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"message": "Internal Server Error"})
					return
				}

				c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"token": tokenString})
				return
			}
		}

		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"message": "Unauthorized"})
	})

	r.GET("/user/:id", func(c *gin.Context) {
		id := c.Param("id")

		for _, user := range users {
			if user.ID == id {
				c.JSON(200, user)
				return
			}
		}

		c.JSON(404, gin.H{"message": "User not found"})
	})

	r.Run()
}
        
        

The updated code now includes a login route that authenticates users based on their username and email. Upon successful authentication, a JWT token is generated and returned to the user. This token is then used to authenticate subsequent requests from the user.

The JWT token includes a claim that contains the username and an expiration time. The token is signed with a secret key to prevent tampering.

The GET route for retrieving user information remains unchanged. However, in a complete implementation, this route should also require authentication and verify the JWT token before returning user information.

Please note that this is a basic implementation and may not include all necessary security measures for a production application. For example, the secret key for signing JWT tokens is hardcoded and the login route does not check for a password. In a real-world application, you should store the secret key securely and include password checking in the login route.

Also, the JWT token does not include any authorization information. In a complete implementation, you should include claims in the JWT token that specify the user's roles and permissions, and check these claims in each route to ensure the user is authorized to perform the requested operation.

References