Secure deserialization process
import java.io.{ByteArrayInputStream, ObjectInputStream}
import play.api.mvc._
import scala.concurrent.ExecutionContext.Implicits.global
class HomeController extends Controller {
def deserializeAction = Action.async(parse.byteArray) { request =>
val bytes = request.body
val ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes))
val obj = ois.readObject()
Future.successful(Ok("Deserialized object: " + obj.toString))
}
}
The above Scala code represents a Play Framework controller with a single action
deserializeAction
. This action handles POST requests and tries to deserialize the request body into an object.
The deserialization process happens in the following lines:
val bytes = request.body
val ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes))
val obj = ois.readObject()
request.body
is read as a byte array, then these bytes are converted to an
ObjectInputStream
via a
ByteArrayInputStream
. Finally, the
readObject
method is called to deserialize the object.readObject
method is called without any validation of the incoming data nor casting to a specific type. This can lead to an insecure deserialization attack where an attacker can craft a serialized object with malicious intent (e.g., to execute arbitrary code, to bypass authentication, etc.).
import java.io.{ByteArrayInputStream, ObjectInputStream}
import play.api.mvc._
import scala.concurrent.ExecutionContext.Implicits.global
class HomeController extends Controller {
def deserializeAction = Action.async(parse.byteArray) { request =>
val bytes = request.body
val ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes))
val obj = ois.readObject()
obj match {
case obj: ExpectedType => // Replace ExpectedType with the type you expect
Future.successful(Ok("Deserialized object: " + obj.toString))
case _ =>
Future.successful(BadRequest("Invalid object type"))
}
}
}
The original code was vulnerable to insecure deserialization attacks because it did not validate the type of the deserialized object before using it. This could allow an attacker to inject malicious objects into the application, leading to a variety of potential attacks such as remote code execution, denial of service, or privilege escalation.
The fixed code mitigates this vulnerability by checking the type of the deserialized object before using it. If the object is of the expected type, it is used normally. If it is not, a
BadRequest
response is returned, indicating that the request contained an invalid object type.
This is a simple type check and may not be sufficient for all use cases. For more complex scenarios, you might need to implement a whitelist or blacklist of allowed or disallowed types, or perform more detailed validation of the object's content.
Additionally, consider using a safer alternative to Java serialization, such as JSON or XML serialization. These formats are less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities and are often easier to validate and debug.